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I. INTRODUCTION
After years of fomenting revolution, Fidel Castro seized con-
trol of Cuba on January 1, 1959.' Adopting a banner of anti-Yan-
keeism, Castro moved Cuba into a close relationship with the So-
viet Union.' Relations with the United States deteriorated
rapidly.' By July, 1960, the Eisenhower Administration reacted to
the growing economic and military ties between Cuba and the So-
viet Union by abandoning its "wait-and-see" policy and sus-
pending all Cuban sugar imports.4 In that same month, the Cuban
government enacted a law authorizing the expropriation of all Cu-
ban properties of United States citizens.5 One enduring effect of
these events has been years of litigation in United States courts
1. C. FRANQUI, DIARY OF THE CUBAN REVOLUTION 482-88 (1980).
2. F.G. GIL, LATIN AMERICAN-UNITED STATES RELATIONS 230 (1971).
3. Id.
4. Id. at 230-31.
5. Joint Appendix on Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit at 57-61, First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba,
103 S. Ct. 2591 (1983) (translating Cuban Law No. 851 of July 6, 1960);
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concerning these expropriations.' First National City Bank v.
Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba7 (Banco Para El Co-
mercio) is the most recent addition to a long line of cases involving
Cuban expropriations.
In Banco Para El Comercio, the issue before the Supreme
Court of the United States was whether Banco Para El Comercio
Exterior de Cuba (BANCEC), a state-owned Cuban bank estab-
lished as a separate juridical entity but since dissolved, could be
considered one and the same with the Republic of Cuba for the
purpose of a counterclaim.' Specifically, First National City Bank
(now "Citibank" 9) sought to set off the value of its expropriated
Cuban branches against any recovery by BANCEC in an action
against Citibank on an unpaid letter of credit.10 In deciding the
question, the Court grappled with a number of competing values
that have come in the wake of both increasing state involvement in
the commercial field through government corporations and recur-
ring expropriations and nationalizations of foreign-owned private
property.
One of the values at stake was the recognition of the separate
legal status of government corporations.1 In this respect, govern-
ment corporations resemble private law corporations." Hence, one
question that necessarily arises is whether the courts should treat a
government corporation as a private corporation in all respects.
6. See, e.g., First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 103 S.
Ct. 2591 (1983); Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976);
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964); Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Chase Manhattan Bank, 658 F.2d 875 (2d Cir. 1981); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chemical
Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 658 F.2d 903 (2d Cir. 1981); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First Nat'l
City Bank, 478 F.2d 191 (2d Cir. 1973).
7. 103 S. Ct. 2591 (1983).
8. Id. at 2593.
9. Id.
10. This author uses the term, "setoff," in its common law sense, whereby a defendant
is permitted to set off claims from unrelated transactions against a plaintiff's claim, if the
claims are liquidated or easily determinable, up to the amount of the plaintiff's claim. J.M.
LANDERS & J.A. MARTIN, CIVIL PROCEDURE 459 (1981). In its stricter sense, setoff refers to
the "legal right of a financial institution to appropriate the deposit of its customer upon the
customer's default" on a loan obligation. The banker's right of setoff operates extrajudically.
Clark, Bank Exercise of Setoff: Avoiding the Pitfalls, 98 BANKING L.J. 196, 196 (1981).
11. See id. at 2599-601; Becker, The Rolimpex Exit from International Contract Re-
sponsibility, 10 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 447, 453-61 (1978); Friedmann, Government Enter-
prise: A Comparative Analysis in GOVERNMENT ENTERPRISE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 303, 314-
15 (W. Friedmann and J.F. Garner eds. 1970); Lasok, Government Intervention and State
Trading, 44 MOD. L. REV. 249, 255-58, 268-69 (1981); Supranowitz, The Law of State-Owned
Enterprises in a Socialist State, 26 LAW & CONTEMP. PRORs. 794, 800-01 (1961).
12. See infra notes 86, 87 and accompanying text.
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Specifically, should courts recognize the principle of limited liabil-
ity,13 considered by many as the hallmark of the corporate form 
14
when government corporations are concerned? Even if the vitality
of limited liability to private corporations is assumed, 5 the reasons
for according limited liability to private corporations do not di-
rectly apply to' government corporations.' 6 One must, however,
consider the interests that will be undermined if American courts
pierce the veil of government corporations too readily or, worse,
arbitrarily. Among these interests are the avoidance of unnecessary
and untimely disputes with foreign states1 7 and the preservation of
respect abroad for the juridical divisions between American mul-
tinational corporations and their independent subsidiaries. 8 These
considerations necessarily raise the question of what is the courts'
proper institutional role in American society: Should courts con-
sider in their decision-making process American foreign policy and
economic interests abroad? 1'
The concerns that favor treating government corporations as
separate legal entities compete with the vindication of traditional
American opposition to expropriation of property in violation of
international law.2 0 In Banco Para El Comercio, the Court's deci-
sion to allow Citibank's counterclaim against BANCEC had much
to do with the fact that the Cuban government had expropriated
Citibank's Cuban branches and that Citibank might not be able to
obtain compensation otherwise.2 Although the decision was not
13. The concept of limited liability provides that "shareholders of a corporation are
under no obligation to the corporation or its creditors other than to pay full consideration
for shares." Meiners, Mofsky & Tollison, Piercing the Veil of Limited Liability, 4 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 351, 353 (1979) (footnote omitted). The theoretical foundation for limited liability
is that the law considers a corporation to be an entity separate from its shareholders. Com-
ment, The Alter Ego Doctrine: Alternative Challenges to the Corporate Form, 30 UCLA L.
REv. 129, 129 (1982).14. Meiners, Mofsky & Tollison, supra note 13, at 352 (quoting H. SOWARDS, CORPORA-
TION LAW 2-2 (1974)).
15. Scholars strongly disagree about the economic and historic importance of limited
liability to the corporate form. Compare Meiners, Mofsky & Tollison, supra note 13, at 352
(questioning whether the rule of limited liability has had any significant impact at all) with
Posner, The Rights of Creditors of Affiliated Corporations, 43 U. Cm. L. REV. 499, 505-07
(1976) (arguing that the rule of limited liability saves transaction costs and facilitates the
extension of credit by providing an implied contractual term without the necessity of
negotiation).
16. See infra notes 140-52 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 173-79 and accompanying text.
18. Id.
19. See infra notes 170-71 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 112, 124-32 and accompanying text.
21. Banco Para El Comercio, 103 S. Ct. at 2603; see infra notes 124-32 and accompany-
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necessarily an undesirable solution to the problem of providing
compensation to Americans whose property has been illegally ex-
propriated, the Court's doctrinal justification for its deci-
sion-BANCEC's dissolution-could work against the very inter-
ests that the Court sought to protect.
22
II. FACTUAL SETTING AND COURT PROCEEDINGS
The Cuban government established BANCEC on April 25,
1960, as "[a]n official autonomous credit institution for foreign
trade . . . with full juridical capacity . . . of its own .... "2
BANCEC's purpose was to "contribute to, and collaborate with,
the international trade policy of the Government and the applica-
tion of the measures concerning foreign trade adopted by the
'Banco Nacional de Cuba'" (hereinafter "Banco Nacional"),
Cuba's central bank.2 4 In accordance with its stated purpose,
BANCEC's duties included maintaining Cuba's balance of pay-
ments equilibrium,2 5 increasing exports without negatively affect-
ing domestic supplies of raw materials and essential articles,2 " ra-
tioning foreign exchange, 27 and stimulating Cuba's foreign trade.2 8
The Cuban government capitalized BANCEC at 6,000,000 Cu-
ban pesos, subject to increase by national law, and subscribed to
all of its stock.29 Every six months, BANCEC's profits, considered
fiscal revenue, went into the General Treasury after the Governing
Council decided whether to set aside any amounts for capital
reserves.3
0
BANCEC's governing board consisted of delegates from Cu-
ban governmental ministries,3' and its president was Ernesto
"Ch" Guevara, Cuba's Minister of State and president of Banco
ing text.
22. See infra paragraph in text following note 166.
23. Joint Appendix on Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit at 37, First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba,
103 S. Ct. 2591 (1983) (translating Cuban Law No. 793 of April 25, 1960, Art. I).
24. Id. at .39 (translating Cuban Law No. 793 of April 25, 1960, Art. I, By-Law VIII).
25. Id. (translating Cuban Law No. 793 of April 25, 1960, Art. I, By-Law VIII(a)).
26. Id. (translating Cuban Law No. 793 of April 25, 1960, Art. I, By-Law VIII(b)).
27. Id. at 40 (translating Cuban Law No. 793 of April 25, 1960, Art. I, By-Law VIII(f)).
28. Id. at 41 (translating Cuban Law No. 793 of April 25, 1960, Art. I, By-Law VIII(k)).
29. Id. at 38 (translating Cuban Law No. 793 of April 25, 1960, Art. I, By-Law IV).
30. Id. at 39 (translating Cuban Law No. 793 of April 25, 1960, Art. I, By-Law V).
31. Id. at 46 (translating Cuban Law No. 793 of April 25, 1960, Art. I, By-Law XI). The
delegates represented the Minister of Commerce, the Minister of Economy, the National
Agrarian Reform Institute (INRA), and the Department of Mines and Petroleum of the
Ministry of Agriculture. Id.
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Nacional.3 2 The board had the authority to appoint, remove, and
replace the general manager," who directed the bank's day-to-day
operations.
34
In accordance with its duties, BANCEC sold a quantity of
sugar to a buyer in the United States." An irrevocable letter of
credit that Citibank issued in favor of BANCEC supported the sale
agreement.3 BANCEC assigned the letter to Banco Nacional for
collection, s7 and on September 12, 1960, Banco Nacional presented
the sight draft for $217,249.50.18 The documents, however, did not
comply with the terms of the letter of credit, because they showed
a shortfall of several thousand pounds of sugar.3' After notice of
the shortfall, Banco Nacional waived payment of $23,969.20 to
compensate for the discrepancy in the delivery. The new amount
due equalled $193,280.30.o On the following day, September 17,
1960, the Cuban government expropriated all Cuban property be-
longing to three American banks, including Citibank.4 1 On Septem-
ber 22, 1960, Citibank credited the new draft amount to Banco Na-
cional's account and applied the balance in the account as a setoff
against the value of its Cuban branches.
42
On February 1, 1961, BANCEC sued Citibank in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York to re-
cover on the unpaid letter of credit." On February 23, 1961, before
Citibank could serve its answer, the Cuban government dissolved
BANCEC and divided its capital between Banco Nacional and the
foreign trade enterprises of the Ministry of Foreign Trade," which
32. Banco Para El Comercio, 103 S. Ct. at 2593.
33. Joint Appendix on Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit at 46, First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba,
103 S. Ct. 2591 (1983) (translating Cuban Law No. 793 of April 25, 1960, Art. I, By-Law XI).
34. Banco Para El Comercio, 103 S. Ct. at 2593.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 2493-94.
37. Id. at 2594.
38. Joint Appendix on Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit at 78, 79, First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de
Cuba, 103 S. Ct. 2591, 2594 (1983).
39. Id. at 117.
40. Id. at 118.
41. Id. at 70-73 (translating Cuban Resolution No. 2 of September 17, 1960). The other
two banks were Chase Manhattan Bank and The First National Bank of Boston. Id.
42. Id. at 119.
43. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 505 F. Supp. 412, 418
(S.D.N.Y. 1980).
44. Banco Para El Comercio, 103 S. Ct. at 2594. Banco Nacional received all rights,
claims and assets "peculiar to the banking business." The Trade Ministry assumed all of
BANCEC's trading functions. Within one week of BANCEC's dissolution, the Ministry as-
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
was established on the same day."5
On March 8, 1961, Citibank filed its answer and counterclaim,
asserting its right to set off the value of its seized branches against
any recovery BANCEC might realize." The case lay dormant until
1975, when BANCEC moved for a substitution of parties.47 The
district court denied the motion and, in 1977, held a bench trial on
the merits."
The district court immediately rejected Citibank's claim that
Banco Nacional was the real party in interest because the draft
against the letter of credit was deposited with Banco Nacional as
agent for collection.4 9 Citing section 350-a of the New York Negoti-
able Instruments Law,50 which was still in force in 1961, the court
held that Citibank could not discharge its obligation to BANCEC
by setting off against funds collected by Banco Nacional as agent
for BANCEC 1 Unless Banco Nacional, as collecting bank, had al-
signed 300,000 of 2,000,000 pesos that it received to the newly created Empresa Cubana de
Exportaciones (Cuban Enterprise for Exports) (hereinafter referred to as "Empresa"),
which remained subrogated to all the rights and obligations pertaining to BANCEC's export
activities. The government then dissolved Empresa by the end of the year and assigned
BANCEC's rights relating to trade in sugar to Empress Cubana Exportadora de Azucar y
sus Derivados (Cuban Enterprise for Sugar Exports) (hereinafter referred to as "Cuba Zu-
car"). Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. On July 7, 1961, BANCEC filed a stipulation stating that BANCEC had been
dissolved and that the Ministry of Foreign Trade held its claim. Although the district court
approved the naming of the Republic of Cuba as plaintiff, no amended complaint showing
the change was ever filed. Id.
47. 103 S. Ct. at 2595. BANCEC now wanted to name Cuba Zucar as plaintiff. Id.
48. Id.
49. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 505 F. Supp. 412, 425
(S.D.N.Y. 1980).
50. N.Y. NEG. INSTR. LAW § 350-a (McKinney 1943), repealed by N.Y. U.C.C. § 4-201
(McKinney 1964). Section 350-a provided, in pertinent part:
Except as otherwise provided by agreement and except as to subsequent holders
of a negotiable instrument payable to bearer or indorsed specially or in blank,
where an item is deposited or received for collection, the bank of deposit shall be
agent of the depositor for its collection and each subsequent collecting bank
shall be sub-agent of the depositor but shall be authorized to follow the instruc-
tions of its immediate forwarding bank and any credit given by any such agent
or sub-agent bank therefore shall be revocable until such time as the proceeds
are received in actual money or an unconditional credit given on the books of
another bank, which such agent has requested or accepted. Where any such
bank allows any revocable credit for an item to be withdrawn, such agency rela-
tion shall nevertheless continue except the banks shall have all the rights of an
owner thereof against prior and subsequent parties to the extent of the amount
withdrawn.
N.Y. NEG. INsT. LAW, § 350-a (McKinney 1943).
51. Chase Manhattan Bank, 505 F. Supp. at 427.
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ready paid the proceeds of the sight draft to BANCEC, those
funds in Banco Nacional's account that corresponded to the draft
amount were held in trust for BANCEC.52 Because "one dealing
with an agent for a disclosed principal may not set-off the agent's
personal indebtedness against amounts due the principal,"53 Ci-
tibank could not set off its claim against Banco Nacional against
the proceeds of the draft."4
The district court nevertheless held that Citibank could prop-
erly counterclaim against BANCEC to set off the value of its seized
assets against any recovery BANCEC might obtain.65 It found no
basis for distinguishing among BANCEC, Banco Nacional, and
Cuba for the purpose of determining whether Citibank's counter-
claim was proper. 56 In rejecting arguments based on BANCEC's in-
dependent juridical status, the court reasoned that "[wihere the
equities are so strong in favor of the counter-claiming defendants,
as they are in this case, the Court should recognize the practicali-
ties of the transactions."5 It further declared that "the devolution
of [BANCEC's] claim, however viewed, brings it into the hands of
the Ministry, or Banco Nacional, each an alter ego of the Cuban
Government."58 Finding that the Cuban government had supplied
all of BANCEC's capital and that BANCEC's only function was to
manage commodity exports for the government, the district court
concluded that BANCEC was engaged in a state function and de-
clared BANCEC itself an "alter ego" of the Cuban government.5'
As a result, the court dismissed BANCEC's complaint."
The court of appeals reversed the district court's judgment
and remanded the case for dismissal of the counterclaim and entry
of judgment in favor of BANCEC for $193,280.30."1 Because the
Cuban government created and operated BANCEC as a separate
52. Id. at 426-27.
53. Id. at 427 (quoting Fuller v. Fasig-Tipton Co., 587 F.2d 103, 106 (2d Cir. 1978)).
54. Id. Noting that there was no evidence that Citibank knew of the agency relation-
ship, the court stated that such knowledge could be inferred from the facts or, alternatively,
that Citibank "was aware of the statutory presumption and had no factual knowledge indi-
cating otherwise." Id.
55. Id. at 430.
56. Id. at 427. Counterclaims, of course, can only be asserted against "opposing par-
ties." FED. R. Civ. P. 13.
57. Chase Manhattan Bank, 505 F. Supp. at 428.
58. Id. at 425.
59. Id. at 425, 428.
60. Id. at 425.
61. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba v. First Nat'l City Bank, 658 F.2d 913,
920 (2d Cir. 1981).
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juridical entity and because BANCEC had taken no part in the
expropriations, the court of appeals held that Citibank could not
properly assert a counterclaim against BANCEC for the value of
its expropriated assets in a suit arising from a purely commercial
transaction between Citibank and BANCEC.6 On certiorari, the
Supreme Court of the United States held, reversed and re-
manded:" Under equitable principles recognized by both interna-
tional law and federal common law, Citibank may properly assert a
counterclaim to set off the value of its assets seized by the Cuban
government against the amount sought by BANCEC. Although the
normal presumption should be that government instrumentalities
are entities distinct from their government, the presumption is
outweighed when, due to the dissolution of the suing instrumental-
ity, the only beneficiaries of recovery would be the government and
those entities that could be considered its alter egos and liable to
the counterclaiming defendant on their own account. First Na-
tional City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba,
103 S. Ct. 2591 (1983).
III. THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS: AN OVERVIEW
Government's increasing involvement in society has led almost
all states to establish state instrumentalities." In a comparative
study of government corporations throughout the world, Professor
Wolfgang Friedmann identified two principal motives for increas-
ing governmental involvement in society: practical economic neces-
62. Id. at 919-20. The court of appeals recognized that BANCEC was principally en-
gaged in promoting foreign trade. Id. It distinguished Banco Para El Comercio from Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. First National City Bank, 478 F.2d 191 (2d Cir. 1973), a case in which
Citibank was able to assert a similar counterclaim against Banco Nacional, on the ground
that Banco Nacional had played an active role in the bank expropriations, whereas no evi-
dence suggested that BANCEC had played such a role. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de
Cuba v. First Nat'l City Bank, 658 F.2d 913, 918-19 (2d Cir. 1981).
63. The purpose of the remand was for the court of appeals to consider BANCEC's
alternative argument on appeal that the district court had erred in determining that the
value of Citibank's Cuban assets exceeded BANCEC's claim. Banco Para El Comercio, -103
S. Ct. at 2604. Because it held that Citibank could not counterclaim at all, the court of
appeals never reached the question. Banco Para El Comercio de Cuba, 658 F.2d at 914-15.
On remand, the court of appeals sustained the district court's decision. It held that (1) the
district court properly considered the going concern value of the branches an allowable item
of loss; (2) the net value of the Cuban branches properly included the claimed loss of $772,
331 for loans made to United States corporations and that Citibank did not have to attempt
collecting from those corporations directly, and (3) the statute of limitations did not bar a
claim for Citibank's liabilities at its head offices because of the expropriations. First Nat'l
City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 744 F.2d 237, 240-43 (2d Cir. 1984).
64. Friedmann, supra note 11, at 303-07.
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sity and political ideology.65
Underdeveloped countries need capital in order to spur eco-
nomic development." Because of the high risks of investing in
these countries, private capital is either unwilling or unable to
launch development ventures."7 Thus, the burden falls on govern-
ment to promote development through state enterprise.6 Even in-
dustrialized countries with significant private sectors, such as the
United States and Canada, have found it necessary to place the
responsibility for certain undertakings squarely on the shoulders of
public corporations.69 In European countries, such as Great Britaiia
and Italy, the state controls certain basic industries.7 0 Despite their
ideology, states that follow the Soviet "brand" of socialism have
modified their philosophy of state ownership of the means of pro-
duction in view of the economic and administrative need to decen-
tralize management through the use of relatively autonomous state
enterprises. 7' Indeed, the pervasive presence of government corpo-
rations on the modern commercial scene71 led Professor Friedmann
to suggest that "the establishment of public enterprises of a more
or less autonomous character ...should be judged on its merits,
as a legitimate instrument of modern government.
'73
One of the primary reasons for channeling state involvement
into various economic sectors through government corporations is
the desire to remove such operations from potentially negative po-
litical and bureaucratic influences. 7' Thus, as Professor Friedmann
suggested, it is generally agreed that a minister or his representa-
tive should not form part of the management of the corporation.7 6
True independence, however, is illusory. First, ministers in
65. Id. at 303.
66. Id. at 303-04.
67. Id. at 303.
68. Id. at 303-04.
69. Id. at 306-07. The Tennessee Valley Authority in the United States is but one ex-
ample. Id. at 306.
70. Id. Margaret Thatcher's Conservative government may have changed things a bit in
Great Britain.
71. Id. at 307.
72. I Congreso del Partido, [1981] 2 All E.R. 1064, 1067 (opinion of Lord Wilberforce).
73. Friedmann, supra note 11, at 306-07.
74. Id. at 304, 307, 316-21; Fabrikant, Developing Country State Enterprises: Perform-
ance and Control, 15 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 40, 42 (1976).
75. Friedmann, supra note 11, at 316. Professor Friedmann wrote: "On this point,
countries whose legal and political systems are otherwise as divergent as those of Britain,
Germany, France, the USSR, the United States, India, Italy, and Australia are unanimous."
Id. In 1960, Cuba obviously disagreed. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
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some countries do sit on governing boards.7 Second, even if they
do not sit on the board, they can still make their influence felt by
threatening to replace independent managers with more compliant
personnel.7 Third, to the extent that government corporations are
not provided with permanent capital assets,78 they depend on peri-
odic appropriations from the national budget.7e Politics inevitably
intrudes into the operation of any entity that depends upon peri-
odic appropriations from the government.80 The lack of financial
independence thus defeats political independence-one of the pri-
mary reasons for the establishment of government corporations."
Fourth, no matter how one looks at it, the basic function of gov-
ernment corporations is to carry out governmental policies,
whether those policies are directed at industrial, commercial, or ag-
ricultural sectors of the economy.82 In some cases, the public cor-
poration merely replaces free enterprise where private capital dare
not go;88 in others, the public corporation acts as a device to decen-
tralize management in a planned economy, where the state owns
the means of production."
As a general rule, whatever the particular function of an indi-
vidual government corporation may be, the state that creates it,s '
endows it with separate legal personality to enable it to accomplish
state objectives." Legal personality allows the public corporation
76. Id. at 316-17.
77. Fabrikant, aupra note 74, at 43.
78. "There is little doubt that any genuine freedom of management and initiative re-
quires that the public corporations, at least those of a revenue-earning character, should
have permanent assets freely at their disposal and not be dependent on periodical political
battles in Parliament or other instruments of Government." Friedmann, supra note 11, at
320.
79. Id. at 319.
80. Id. at 320.
81. See id. at 304, 320-21. Predictably, most public corporations must remit to the gov-
ernment whatever profits they do not apply to their own development. Id. at 321.
82. See id. at 303-07. Professor Friedmann concluded emphatically: "[Nlowhere is the
public corporation completely independent in its financial status and operation. Nor indeed
could it be as long as it forms in some respects a part of Governmental responsibilities." Id.
at 320.
83. See supro notes 66-70 and accompanying text.
84. See supra note 71 and accompanying text; Lasok, supra note 11, at 264-67.
85. Most government "corporations are created either by special statute or by Govern-
ment ordinance." Friedmann, supra note 11, at 313. The government corporation is to be
distinguished from what Professor Friedmann called the "joint stock company controlled
completely or partly by public authority." Id. at 307, 310-13. Such joint stock companies are
often mixed public-private undertakings, see id. at 310-12, removing them somewhat from
the realm of "true" government corporations.
86. Id. at 314; see Supranowitz, supra note 11, at 800.
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to sue and be sued in its own name, to conclude contracts, and to
hold and dispose of property. 7
Because of the important role that the government corpora-
tion plays in economic development, Professor Friedmann sug-
gested that a government corporation should approximate a pri-
vate legal person as much as political responsibility allows.8 8 It
should enjoy no tax advantages or priorities in debt collection. 9
The government should keep its assets and liabilities apart from
the government's general funds.9 0
IV. THE "ACTIVE ROLE" CRITERION FOR ALLOWING
COUNTERCLAIMS AGAINST GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS FOR THE
WRONGS OF THE GOVERNMENT
Until Banco Para El Comercio, the Supreme Court of the
United States, by its own admission, had never considered the sep-
arate status of a foreign government corporation. 1 Most of the re-
ported decisions in the United States that deal with the status of
foreign government corporations have dealt only with the issue of
whether those corporations enjoy the same benefits of sovereign
immunity that states themselves enjoy." Aside from Banco Para
El Comercio, only two other American cases have dealt with the
issue of whether a counterclaim based on the wrongful acts of the
government may be asserted against its instrumentality. It is not
surprising that both cases involve Cuba's expropriation of assets
belonging to American banks.
9 3
87. Friedmann, supra note 11, at 313-15; Supranowitz, supra note 11, at 800.
88. Friedmann, supra note 11, at 333-36.
89. Id. at 336.
90. See id. at 334.
91. Banco Para El Comercio, 103 S. Ct. at 2598 n.12. The Court, however, has in the
past considered the legal status of United States instrumentalities under federal law. See,
e.g., Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Fin. Corp., 306 U.S. 381 (1939); United States Grain
Corp. v. Phillips, 261 U.S. 106 (1923); Sloan Shipyards Corp. v. United States Board Emer-
gency Fleet Corp., 258 U.S. 549 (1922); Bank of United States v. Planter's Bank of Ga., 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 904 (1824).
92. See, e.g., In re Rio Grande Transport, Inc., 516 F. Supp. 1155 (S.D.N.Y. 1981);
United Euram Corp. v. U.S.S.R., 461 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Yessenin-Volpin v.
Novosti Press Agency, 443 F. Supp. 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Edlow Int'l Co. v. Nuklearna Elek-
trarna Krsko, 441 F. Supp. 827 (D.D.C. 1977). For comprehensive treatment of sovereign
immunity issues, see Dellapenna, Suing Foreign Governments and Their Corporations: Sov-
ereign Immunity (pts. 1-5), 85 COMM. L.J. 167, 228, 298, 364, 497 (1980).
93. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 658 F.2d 903 (2d
Cir. 1981) (companion case to Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba v. First Nat'l City
Bank, 658 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1981)); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First Nat'l City Bank, 478
F.2d 191 (2d Cir. 1973).
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In the first decision, Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First Na-
tional City Bank,4 (hereinafter "Banco I"), the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit held that although Banco Nacional was or-
ganized as a separate juridical entity, Citibank could set off the
value of its expropriated Cuban branches against the excess real-
ized on the sale of collateral for a loan made to Banco Nacional."
The court concluded that for the purposes of the litigation, Banco
Nacional was an alter ego of the Cuban government, because the
bank had actively collaborated with the government in the expro-
priation of Citibank's branches by taking over the operations of
the branches pursuant to government order."
The second case, Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chemical Bank
N.Y. Trust Co. 97 (hereinafter "Banco II") presented the court of
appeals with a somewhat more complex problem. In that case,
Banco Nacional sued Chemical Bank and two other New York
banks to recover the deposits of private Cuban banks that the Cu-
ban government had expropriated." Banco Nacional also sought
release of its own deposit, which Chemical Bank had withheld."
Chemical Bank and the two other banks counterclaimed against
Banco Nacional in order to set off the balance due on loans made
to the Cuban Electric Company, a Florida corporation whose Cu-
ban assets Cuba expropriated. 100 The banks argued that Cuba had
assumed the obligation to pay Cuban Electric's overdue loans by
virtue of its having expropriated Cuban Electric's assets.101 The
court of appeals disallowed the counterclaim insofar as recovery of
Banco Nacional's own deposit was concerned.10 2 Finding that
Banco Nacional had neither collaborated in the expropriation of
Cuban Electric's assets nor benefited from it in any way, the court
of appeals held that there was no reason for imputing to Banco
Nacional the acts of the Cuban government.103 Nor was there any
reason for imputing to the Cuban government the ownership of de-
posits that Banco Nacional was claiming for itself, because the
bank had been established as a separate and distinct juridical en-
94. 478 F.2d 191 (2d Cir. 1973).
95. Id. at 193-94.
96. Id.
97. 658 F.2d 903 (2d Cir. 1981).
98. Id. at 905, 906.
99. Id. at 905.
100. Id. at 905-07.
101. Id. at 907.
102. Id. at 910.
103. Id.
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tity.10 4 In contrast, the court allowed the counterclaim asserted
against Banco Nacional in its capacity as successor to the private
banks. The court reasoned that Banco Nacional was acting as an
agent of the Cuban government by virtue of its having received the
expropriated banks. 10 5
The rule of law that emerged from the court of appeals's deci-
sions in Banco 11 and Banco 11107 is that a government instru-
mentality organized as an independent juridical entity is not liable
for the obligations incurred by its government when the instru-
mentality neither participated in nor benefited from the act that
gave rise to the obligation. Instead, the Second Circuit has predi-
cated liability upon a finding that the instrumentality was acting
on behalf of the government either in the performance of the act
that gave rise to the obligation" or in the prosecution of a claim
based upon the wrongful act of the government. 09 The Second Cir-
cuit in Banco Para El Comercio relied on the same distinctions to
deny Citibank's claim against BANCEC." 0 Thus, the "active role"
test applied in Banco I and Banco II is dispositive in a judicial
determination on the issue of the liability of a government corpo-
ration for the wrongs of the government-at the least, this is the
test that the Second Circuit chose to apply.
V. THE SUPREME COURT'S FORMULATION: Is THE PRESUMPTION OF
INDEPENDENCE OUTWEIGHED?
Once the case reached the Supreme Court, judicial focus
changed. If Citibank were to succeed in its counterclaim, the court
of appeals's "active role" test would have to be expanded to in-
clude other criteria that would justify disregarding BANCEC's sep-
104. Id.
105. Id. at 910-11. Interestingly, the court allowed Chemical Bank's counterclaim even
though it was not based on an expropriation of Chemical Bank assets by the Cuban govern-
ment but arose merely from a loan default. In Banco II, the court characterized its decision
as one based on a conclusion that the Cuban government was the "real party in interest" in
the prosecution of the claim to recover the private banks' deposits. Id. at 911.
106. 478 F.2d 191 (2d Cir. 1973).
107. 658 F.2d 903 (2d Cir. 1981).
108. The application of the "active role" test to Banco I is discussed in Ryan, Defaults
and Remedies under International Bank Loan Agreements with Foreign Sovereign Borrow-
ers-A New York Lawyer's Perspective, 1982 ILL. L. REv. 89, 108-09. The author also identi-
fies the factors considered by courts in the context of loan defaults by foreign governments
or their instrumentalities. Id.
109. Id. at 109.
110. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba v. First Nat'l City Bank, 658 F.2d 913,
919 (2d Cir. 1981).
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arate juridical status.
The Court immediately rejected BANCEC's argument that
conflict of law principles required that the law of the state of incor-
poration, Cuba, determine whether a government corporation
could be held liable for the actions of its sovereign."' Drawing a
distinction between the internal affairs of a corporation and the
rights of third parties external to the corporation, the Court stated:
To give conclusive effect to the law of the chartering state in
determining whether the separate juridical status of its instru-
mentality should be respected would permit the state to violate
with impunity the rights of third parties under international law
while effectively insulating itself from liability in foreign courts.
We decline to permit such a result."'
The Court, nevertheless, adopted a presumption in favor of
the separate status of government corporations: "[G]overnment in-
strumentalities established as separate juridical entities distinct
and independent from their sovereign should normally be treated
as such."'1 8 Among the reasons that the Court cited for adhering to
this presumption is the role that instrumentalities play in securing
much needed financing for developing countries by assuring pro-
spective creditors that they will be able to seek judicial relief.1" To
this end, the juridical and fiscal independence of instrumentalities
should be respected.115 Furthermore, principles of comity among
nations mandate respect by the courts of one nation for the divi-
sions established by the government of another."" Finally, the
Court interpreted the legislative history of the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act of 1976 (hereinafter "FSIA"), as a directive from
Congress to respect the independent status of state instru-
mentalities.
1 1 7
Refusing to adopt what it called a "mechanical formula," the
Court rejected the standard that the district court had adopted
and that Citibank and the United States, as amicus curiae, urged
111. Banco Para Comercio, 103 S. Ct. at 2597.
112. Id. (footnotes omitted).
113. Id. at 2600.
114. Id. at 2600; see also supra text accompanying notes 64-73, 87.
115. 103 S. Ct. at 2600.
116. Id. at 2600.
117. Id. at 2600-01 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 29-30, reprinted
in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Nzws 6604, 6628-29) [hereinafter cited as House REPORT];
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-1611 (1982) (amending
28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1391, 1441 (1976)).
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it to adopt.' Under that standard, whether the court recognized
the separate status of a government instrumentality would turn, in
part, on whether the instrumentality in question performed a "gov-
ernment function." ' 1 The Court rejected this standard because it
perceived that the "concept of a 'usual' or a 'proper' governmental
function changes over time and varies from nation to nation."120 In
view of the role instrumentalities play in giving effect to govern-
mental policies,' mechanical application of the suggested stan-
dard would result in the automatic "piercing of the veil" whenever
a party sued a government corporation. Although it may not make
sense for the court to apply to a government corporation the same
principles of limited liability that apply to a private law corpora-
tion,"'2 if a court pierces the corporate veil, it should do so for
more substantive reasons than its perception that a public corpora-
tion performs governmental functions. The Court wisely rejected
that standard.
The Court, instead, purported to adopt a considerably more
flexible approach by asking whether the equities of the case mer-
ited disregard of the instrumentality's independent status.22 The
Court decided that the equities so favored Citibank that they over-
came the presumption in favor of BANCEC's independent sta-
tus.' 2 4 In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted that because of
"considerations of fair dealing," a foreign sovereign asserting a
claim in a United States court could not plead sovereign immunity
as a bar to a counterclaim. 2 5 Had Cuba itself brought the action
against Citibank to recover on the unpaid letter of credit, Citibank
could have properly asserted a counterclaim to set off the value of
its expropriated assets in Cuba. 2
118. 103 S. Ct. at 2603 & n.27; see Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank,
505 F. Supp. 412, 425, 428 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
119. 103 S. Ct. at 2603 & n.27.
120. Id.
121. See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
122. See infra notes 136-52 and accompanying text.
123. 103 S. Ct. at 2601-03.
124. See id. at 2603.
125. Id. at 2602 (quoting National City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356, 365
(1955)). Justice Frankfurter authored Republic of China, which held that the Republic of
China could not interpose sovereign immunity as a defense to a counterclaim by National
City Bank in an action brought by the Chinese government to recover an amount deposited
by one of its agencies in the bank, when the counterclaim arose from a general course of
business. The Republic of China holding is now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1607(c) (1982).
HousE REPORT, supra note 117, at 6622.
126. See 103 S. Ct. at 2602.
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Notwithstanding the Court's rather broad language, the spe-
cific facts of Banco Para El Comercio make the basis for the
Court's holding quite narrow.2 7 BANCEC, because of its dissolu-
tion, was nothing more than a nominal party to the action.'". The
Court concluded that the Cuban government and Banco Nacional
would have been the real beneficiaries of any recovery by
BANCEC."9 In the Court's view, the reason for this conclusion
was simple: BANCEC's assets had been divided between Banco
Nacional, on the one hand, and the Ministry of Foreign Trade, on
the other.8 0 Even though the Trade Ministry's share of the assets
ultimately came to rest with other instrumentalities,"'3 the Court
declined to allow this fact to change its holding, stating: "To hold
-therwise would permit governments to avoid the requirements of
international law simply by creating juridical entities whenever the
need arises."' 32
The Court was so preoccupied with BANCEC's dissolution
that it gave only the most cursory treatment' to the fact that by
denying recovery to BANCEC, it was actually depriving other vic-
tims of the Cuban expropriations of their ratable portions of Cu-"
ban funds frozen in the United States."4 Had it been truly con-
cerned with the specific equities of this case, the Court might well
have reached the same conclusion advanced in the minority
opinion:
Petitioner is only one of many American citizens whose property
was nationalized by the Cuban Government. It seeks to mini-
mize its losses by retaining $193,280.30 that a purchaser of Cu-
ban sugar had deposited with it for the purpose of paying for
the merchandise, which was delivered in due course. Having won
this lawsuit, petitioner will simply retain the money. If peti-
tioner's contentions in this case had been rejected, the money
would be placed in a fund comprised of frozen Cuban assets, to
be distributed equitably among all the American victims of Cu-
ban nationalizations .... Even though petitioner has suffered a
serious injustice at the hands of the Cuban Government, no spe-
127. See K.N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 40 (1960) ("The court can decide only
the particular dispute which is before it.").
128. See 103 S. Ct. at 2602-03.
129. Id. at 2602.
130. Id. at 2602 & n.22; see supra note 44 and accompanying text.
131. See supro note 44.
132. 103 S. Ct. at 2603.
133. See id. at 2602 n.24.
134. See Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 515 (1982); Ryan, supra note
108, at 109.
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cial equities militate in favor of giving this petitioner a prefer-
ence over all other victims simply because of its participation in
a discrete, completed, commercial transaction involving the sale
of a load of Cuban sugar."
A close reading of the majority opinion reveals that the Court
was looking beyond the specific facts of the case before it to the
general problem of dealing with' the separate juridical status of
government corporations, on the one hand, and the foreign expro-
priation of American property, on the other. Although the Court
gave due regard to important policy considerations, it failed to ar-
ticulate a satisfactory doctrinal reason for its holding.
VI. DOCTRINAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION
IN Banco Para El Comercio
A. A Misguided Presumption
The Supreme Court's fundamental assumption was that sepa-
rate legal personality and its corollary, limited liability, are as vital
to public corporations as they are supposed'to be to private law
corporations.' The Court consequently adopted a presumption in
favor of a government corporation's independent status. 1- 7 This
presumption was misguided.
General corporation laws accord separate legal personality to
the private law corporation in order to endow it with the capacity
to sue and be sued as a firm, to conclude contracts, and to hold
property in the firm name.138 The government corporation may
nevertheless enjoy these attributes without specific legislation pro-
viding for the full status of legal personality.13 9
The concept of limited liability is likewise inapplicable to gov-
ernment corporations. One commonly cited reason for recognizing
135. 103 S. Ct. at 2605 n.2 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Jus-
tices Brennan and Blackmun joined in Justice Stevens's opinion.
136. See id. at 2599. The Court declared: "[W]hat the Court stated with respect to
private corporations in Anderson v. Abbott,. . . is true also for governmental corporations:
'Limited liability is the rule, not the exception; and on that assumption large undertakings
are rested, vast enterprises are launched, and huge sums of capital attracted.'" Id. at 2599-
600 (quoting Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U.S. 349, 362 (1944)).
137. Id. at 2601.
138. See Sowards & Mofsky, Factors Affecting the Development of Corporation Law,
23 U. MIAmi L. REv. 476, 479 (1969).
139. Friedmann, supra note 11, at 315. In Australia, for example, the South Australian
Dried Fruits Board is noted to have carried out "a multitude of transactions which presup-
pose legal personality," even though no legislative or administrative document conferred
legal personality upon it. Id. at 314.
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the limited liability of shareholders is to encourage investment in
business ventures by many individuals who would otherwise be un-
able to invest without the risk of suffering disastrous losses should
the venture fail.140 The diversification of risk, as it is called, makes
the selling of shares easier and allows the market for corporate
control to eliminate inefficient management.14 ' Except in the case
of mixed public-private undertakings, it is immediately apparent
that diversification of risk is hardly the moving force behind the
use of government corporations. The desire for freedom from polit-
ical and bureaucratic influences is probably the primary motiva-
tion behind their establishment.14 2 Moreover, with the government
as sole shareholder, broadly based participation and ease of trans-
ferability of shares are not pertinent considerations.
4 3
Sole government ownership of government corporations also
makes inapposite the rationale that supports conferring limited lia-
bility upon private law corporations. The rationale is that limited
liability reduces transaction costs, because it is easier for a pro-
spective voluntary creditor to evaluate the credit-worthiness of a
single corporation than it is for the small investor to monitor not
only the financial position of the corporations whose shares he
owns but that of his fellow shareholders as well.'
4
4
Notwithstanding the above doctrinal shortcomings, the Court
made a somewhat persuasive a priori argument in favor of treating
the assets and liabilities of instrumentalities as distinct from those
of the government." 5 According to the Court, credit transactions
with government instrumentalities would be jeopardized if third
parties were allowed recovery against the instrumentalities as com-
pensation for the acts of the government. 4 6 The proposition, how-
ever, loses its force in view of the realities of the banking world.
Consider two hypothetical scenarios.
First is the case of a development loan to a third world coun-
try. If the World Bank extends a loan to a state entity that is not
the government of a member country, it is required to obtain the
140. See, e.g., Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and Economics, 53 VA. L
REv., 259, 262 (1967); Comment, supra note 13, at 135. Contra Meiners, Mofsky & Tollison,
supra note 13, at 362-63.
141. See Manne, supra note 140, at 262-65.
142. See supra text accompanying- note 74.
143. See Friedmann, supra note 11, at 311-12.
144. Manne, supra note 136, at 262-63. Contra Meiners, Mofsky & Tollison, supra note
13, at 363.
145. See Banco Para El Comercio, 103 S. Ct. at 2599.
146. Id.
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guarantee of the member country in whose territory the project is
to be financed. " " A private bank is likely to negotiate for similar
guarantees from the entity's government.' " Both are protected,
even if a third party were to obtain affirmative recovery against the
government corporation and deprive it of all of its assets--a most
unlikely scenario.
Second, consider the commercial credit transaction tied to the
sale of goods; several options are open to the creditor. Once again,
a creditor might require a guarantee from the entity's government.
The creditor's own state may have instituted a program of export
credit insurance covering short- and medium-term credits.14 ' If the
creditor is a bank, it can require the instrumentality to keep de-
posits with it and provide for a formal setoff clause in the loan
agreement. 50 Alternatively, the creditor could require the borrow-
ing entity to pledge certificates of deposit held at some bank and
proceed to perfect its interest and notify the bank of the pledge so
as to defeat any possible right of setoff the bank might have.""
Irrespective of which rule of law controlled, creditors would soon
adapt to it and find new ways of doing business."'
147. Silkenat, The Role of International Development Institutions in International
Project Financing: IBRD, IFC and Co-Financing Techniques, 17 INT'L LAW. 615, 617 (1983).
148. Silkenat, Eurodollar Borrowings by Developing States: Terms and Negotiating
Problems, 20 HARV. INT'L L.J. 89, 100-01 (1979).
149. L. HENKIN, R.C. PUGH, 0. SCHACHTER & H. SMiT, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 796 (1980) [hereinafter cited as INTERNATIONAL LAW].
150. Findlay, Setoff Under International Loan Agreements: Danger Spots and De-
tours, 99 BANKING L.J. 447, 453 (1982).
151. See Clark, supra note 9, at 222-24. A bank with notice of a third party's interest in
funds deposited by its customer cannot set off against those funds. Id. at 215.
152. Cf. Meiners, Mofsky & Tollison, supra note 13, at 360-61 (a creditor offering a
loan to a corporation could insist that the assets of both the corporation and the sole share-
holder collateralize the transaction). Restricting disregard of the government instrumental-
ity's separateness to setoff by way of counterclaim, the procedural context of Banco Para El
Comercio, Banco I, and Banco II, arguably eliminates the risks to third party creditors who
are not diligent enough to take precautions like those outlined above. Because no affirmative
recovery is involved, the instrumentality's assets are not depleted. For a discussion of setoff,
see J.M. LANDERS & J.A. MARTIN, supra note 9, at 459. Note, however, that the only reason
Citibank was able to assert a setoff by way of counterclaim against BANCEC was because
BANCEC sued it to recover the draft proceeds that Citibank kept when it exercised its
banker's right of setoff against Banco Nacional. See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying
text. Citing Section 350-a of the New York Negotiable Instruments Law, the district court
held that the setoff was improper. Chase Manhattan Bank, 505 F. Supp. at 425; see supra
notes 49-54 and accompanying text. Only the counterclaim issue reached the Supreme Court
of the United States. See Banco Para El Comercio, 103 S. Ct. at 2593. Although allowance
of the counterclaim seems to give judicial sanction to the original setoff, it is still an open
question whether a bank, finding its assets expropriated, may obtain the same results with-
out resort to a counterclaim. See generally Clark, supra note 9, at 197 (In addition to other
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B. Presumption Overcome
Despite its professed respect for the separate status of govern-
ment instrumentalities, the Court found the presumption of inde-
pendent status overcome in BANCEC's case. 53 As- previously dis-
cussed, the Court relied on the fact that BANCEC had been
dissolved and that, one way or the other, the Cuban government
would be the "real beneficiary" of any judgment in BANCEC's
favor.
1 54
In deciding that Cuba lost either way, the Court avoided hav-
ing to pass on the district court's neat characterization of the letter
of credit as "the sort of asset, right and claim peculiar to the bank-
ing business," that probably should be regarded as belonging to
Banco Nacional because of BANCEC's dissolution. 55 Otherwise,
the Court may have had to decide whether the instrumentalities
that took over BANCEC's trading functions, Empresa and Cuba
Zucar, 66 were also alter egos of the Cuban government.
According to the minority opinion, that was precisely one of
the issues left unanswered." 7 The minority found that BANCEC's
dissolution, the Trade Ministry's holding of the assets, and the as-
sets' subsequent transfer to the independent trade enterprises
could have just as easily been viewed as a "single integrated plan
of corporate reorganization."' 55 As BANCEC argued, the Minis-
try's role may have been nothing more than that of a trustee.' 5 '
Although the minority concurred with the majority's refusal to al-
ways "pierce the veil" of government corporations as well as with
the majority's rejection of the "governmental function" standard,
it recommended that the judgment be vacated and the case re-
manded to the court of appeals for further findings concerning
BANCEC's legal status and operational autonomy. °
BANCEC's operational autonomy is now a moot point because
requirements of maturity of the debt and mutuality of obligation, there must be a debt
owing to the bank by the depositor to justify setoff.).
153. Banco Para El Comercio de Cuba, 103 S. Ct. at 2602-03.
154. See supra notes 128-32 and accompanying text.
155. Chase Manhattan Bank, 505 F. Supp. at 424.
156. See supra note 44.
157. See 103 S. Ct. at 2604-05.
158. Id. at 2604.
159. Id. at 2604-05.
160. Id. at 2605. The minority further noted that only one witness had testified on
these matters and that the record contained many pertinent documents whose legal signifi-
cance had yet to be interpreted by an expert. These evidentiary deficiencies precluded the
Court from correctly and accurately applying the principles it had enunciated. Id. at 2604.
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of its dissolution. Nevertheless, the objections the minority raised
have some merit. For example, what if the Ministry of Trade never
had anything to do with BANCEC's assets, and the assets had
been transferred directly to other instrumentalities that had
played no role in the expropriation? This possibility suggests that
the Court should have at least inquired into the independent sta-
tus of Empresa and Cuba Zucar, as it did with BANCEC.
It is apparent that one of the objectives that the majority
sought to achieve was to broaden the court of appeals's narrow for-
mulation of the alter ego doctrine."' By focusing on who the "real
beneficiaries" of any recovery would be, instead of on the "active
role" distinction to which the court of appeals adhered, the Su-
preme Court corrected one of shortcomings in the court of ap-
peals's "active role" standard. That shortcoming, highlighted by
the United States in its amicus curiae brief, was that "govern-
ments contemplating expropriation may protect themselves from
liability in American courts simply by ensuring that their instru-
mentalities with assets or claims in the United States do not play a
'key role' in the expropriation.' 62
The Supreme Court's reliance on the alter ego doctrine in
cases where there is a dissolution of an entity claiming separate
legal. status is not without a modicum of support in international
jurisprudence. In the case of In re Barcelona Traction, Light &
Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain),'6 8 the International Court of Justice
noted that international law refers "to rules generally accepted by
municipal legal systems which recognize the limited company
whose capital is represented by shares, and not to the municipal
law of a particular State . . . ."." The International Court. ac-
knowledged two situations that merited disregard of the corporate
form. One was the familiar "abuse of corporate privilege" 165 upon
which American courts rely when invoking the alter ego doctrine in
private corporate law. The other was the corporation's ceasing to
exist as a legal entity. 166
161. See supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
162. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, on Certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit at 8, First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comer-
cio Exterior de Cuba, 103 S. Ct. 2591 (1983).
163. 1970 I.C.J. 3 (Judgment of Feb. 5).
164. Id. at 37.
165. Id. at 38-39.
166. Id. at 40-41. In Barcelona Traction, the International Court denied Belgium
standing to assert against Spain the claims of Belgian nationals who were shareholders of a
defunct Canadian corporation whose assets Spain had expropriated. Id. at 50. One of the
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The Supreme Court's doctrinal solution to Banco Para El Co-
mercio, whether or not supported in law, may not help claimants
like Citibank in the future. Difficult questions will arise when the
named instrumentality has not been dissolved and has not played
an active role in the acts that gave rise to its government's obliga-
tions. A government facing a similar situation may wait until after
it has obtained a judgment to dissolve the instrumentality. Alter-
natively, if the instrumentality has been dissolved before judg-
ment, its assets may be transferred directly to other "innocent"
entities, bypassing the government coffers altogether. The ease
with which a government may circumvent the rule of Banco Para
El Comercio suggests the need for a more effective rule of law.
VII. FOUR ALTERNATIVES TO THE RULE OF Banco Para El
Comercio
The first and obvious alternative to the rule in Banco Para El
Comercio is judicial adoption of a rule that the courts shall treat
the government corporation as if it were the government itself, re-
gardless of the instrumentality's juridical status under its domestic
law. The doctrinal basis for this alternative rule is that the reasons
that support the rule of limited liability for private corporations do
not apply to the public corporation.1 67 A rule of unlimited liability
destroys the presumption that the Supreme Court adopted in favor
of separate status. 6s
The benefits of this alternative rule are that it is predictable
and neutral-two important values to be sought in law." 9 One of
the problems with the Supreme Court's reasoning in Banco Para
El Comercio is that it has neither of these qualities. Its lack of
predictability destroys its value to Americans who invest abroad.
Under the Banco Para El Comercio decision, no government whose
wholly-owned corporation had assets in the United States could be
certain of the outcome of future litigation and might therefore risk
an expropriation. Banco Para El Comercio would pose no deter-
rent whatsoever. No potential private litigant would know how
best to ensure some compensation in the event that a foreign gov-
reasons for the court's decision was that the corporation had not ceased to exist as a legal
entity. Id. at 41.
167. See supra notes 136-48 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 109-13 and accompanying text.
169. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 comment i (1967) (on pre-
dictability); B.N. CARDOZO, The Nature of the Judicial Process, in SELECTED WRITINGS OF
BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDOZO 107, 153 (M. Hall ed. 1980).
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ernment expropriated its assets.1 70 Moreover, the Supreme Court's
own decision might have differed if the expropriating country had
been a country less antagonistic to the United States than Cuba. 17
Although such distinctions may be necessary on a political level,
their use by the courts undermines the position of courts as neu-
tral arbiters of legal rights. A rule based only on the inapplicability
of the limited liability rule would not recognize political distinc-
tions among countries, and thus would preserve the courts' institu-
tional role.
A second alternative is a rule allowing for different judicial
treatment of government instrumentalities based on the character
of the entity involved in the litigation. This is no longer a blanket
170. See generally Comment, American Oil Investors' Access to Domestic Courts in
Foreign Nationalization Disputes, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 610, 636 (1975) (The author suggests
that "one goal of the oil investor should be to posture himself in relationships, in which
property of various Arab oil producing states is in the legal possession of the investor or
parties friendly to him" so that such property can be converted in response to nationaliza-
tion. The conversion forces the nationalizing state to litigate in American courts and allows
the investor to use the possible counterclaim exception to the act of state doctrine in First
Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972)).
171. If the "offending" state were important enough to American interests, the Presi-
dent might invoke the act of state doctrine, pursuant to the Hickenlooper Amendment, 22
U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1982).
In the seminal case of Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897), Chief Justice Fuller
stated the doctrine:
Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every other sover-
eign State, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of
the government of another done.within its own territory. Redress of grievances
by reason of such acts must be obtained through the means open to be availed of
by sovereign powers as between themselves.
Id. at 252.
In Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 431-32 (1964), the Supreme
Court extended the act of state doctrine to hold that American courts would not pass on the
legality of foreign expropriations of property under international law. The Sabbatino Court
stated that the doctrine rests upon the "distribution of functions between the judicial and
political branches of government on matters bearing upon foreign affairs." Id. at 427-28.
The Court also pointed out that:
The doctrine . . . expresses the strong sense of the Judicial Branch that its en-
gagement in the task of passing on the validity of foreign acts of state may hin-
der rather than further this country's pursuit of goals both for itself and for the
community of nations as a whole in the international sphere.
Id. at 423.
Recently, however, federal legislation has made inroads into the act of state doctrine
insofar as it applies to expropriations that violate international law:
[N]o court in the United States shall decline on the ground of the federal act of
state doctrine to make a determination on the merits giving effect to the princi-
ples of international law in a case in which a claim of title or other rights to
property is asserted by any party including a foreign state (or a party claiming
through such state) based upon ...a confiscation or other taking . . ..
22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1982).
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rule of unlimited liability but merely a reversal of the presumption
that the Court espoused in Banco Para El Comercio. Whereas
Banco Para El Comercio presumed the independent status of a
government corporation unless the circumstances required other-
wise, '7 a modified unlimited liability rule would presume that no
government corporation was independent unless proven otherwise.
Factors that a court might consider in determining the instrumen-
tality's degree of independence would include whether the entity
had permanent capital assets, whether it had revenue-earning ca-
pacity, and whether it was a mixed public-private undertaking.
70
The closer a government-owned public corporation came to resem-
bling a private corporation, the stronger the case for its entitle-
ment to limited liability.
Although this alternative rule may not be as easy for courts to
apply as the bright-line rule of unlimited liability, it allows for dif-
ferences in organization among different states and among govern-
ment corporations within a single state. It is possible that in order
to get a business underway, a state would be willing to underwrite
the initial capital investment in a corporation in exchange for stock
and leave management decisions to a group of aspiring entrepre-
neurs. At some future time, the government might assign its shares
to the managers and employees in exchange for their services,
changing the corporation's status to that of a privately owned com-
pany. In such a case, neither the rationale of unlimited liability nor
the cognizable differences between a soon-to-be private corporation
that happens to be government-owned and a full fledged govern-
ment corporation support the holding that the entity is liable for
the wrongful acts of the government.
A third alternative, which has little to do with pure doctrine,
is to adopt a rule of reciprocity. Because of the United States's
limited or non-existent use of government corporations abroad,
true reciprocity is impossible. Instead, the United States might
base its recognition of the separate status of government corpora-
tions on the concerned state's recognition of the separate status of
foreign subsidiaries and affiliates of private American corporations.
In all likelihood, not all states have yet had the opportunity to
consider the separate status of American-owned subsidiaries, it
might be desirable to incorporate a rule of reciprocity in a bilateral
172. See supra text accompanying notes 136-37.
173. The factors are similar to current standards used in piercing the veil of American
private corporations. Of course, the lack of these characteristics could be used to overcome a
presumption in favor of limited liability.
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treaty, 7 " perhaps in a Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navi-
gation. Under the supremacy clause of the United States Constitu-
tion, ' 7 5 the courts in the United States would be required to apply
the rule of reciprocity whenever an action concerning the other
state's government corporations was brought in the United States.
Treaty-based reciprocity would give full vindication to the pol-
icies underlying the Congressional intent that the FSIA prohibit
execution against the property of one foreign agency or instrumen-
tality to satisfy a judgment against another unrelated agency or
instrumentality. 176 In enacting section 1610(b) of the FSIA, Con-
gress feared that "[i]f U.S. law did not respect the separate juridi-
cal identities of different agencies or instrumentalities, it might en-
courage foreign jurisdictions to disregard the juridical divisions
between different U.S. corporations or between a U.S. corporation
and its independent subsidiary.'
' 77
At present, there appears to be no rule of customary interna-
tional law requiring the recognition by the courts of one state of a
company incorporated under the laws of another state. 7 ' Even
174. For example, the Agreement on Trade Relations, Apr. 2, 1975, United States-
Romania, Annex 3, para. 1, 26 U.S.T. 2305, 2322, T.I.A.S. No. 8159, encompassed both pri-
vate and government corporations:
1. In this Agreement "firms, companies and economic organizations" of the
United States of America shall include corporations, partnerships, sole proprie-
torships, companies and other economic associations constituted under the laws
and regulations applicable in the United States of America, and "firms, compa-
nies and economic organizations" of the Socialist Republic of Romania shall in-
clude state enterprises, industrial centrals, enterprises with the status of centrals
and other enterprises which carry out foreign trade activities in accordance with
laws and regulations applicable in the Socialist Republic of Romania.
Id.
175. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
176. HousE REPORT, supra note 117, at 6628; see 28 U.S.C. § 1610(b) (1982).
177. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 117, at 6628-29. Courts may decide whether property
held by one agency is really the property of the other. Id. at 6629.
178. Drucker, Companies in Private International Law, 17 INr'L & COMP. L.Q. 28, 42
(1968). As a matter of course, the United States includes a clause in its friendship, com-
merce and navigation treaties providing for the recognition of the juridical status of compa-
nies of each party in the territory of the other party. See, e.g., Treaty of Amity, Economic
Relations, and Consular Rights, Aug. 15, 1955, United States-Iran, art. III, para. 1, 8 U.S.T.
899, 902, T.I.A.S. No. 3853; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Oct. 29, 1954,
United States-Federal Republic of Germany, art. XXV, para. 5, 7 U.S.T. 1839, 1866,
T.I.A.S. No. 3593; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Feb. 2, 1948, United
States-Italy, art. II, para. 2, 63 Stat. 2255, 2258, T.I.A.S. No. 1965.
There is considerable scholarly debate on the question whether treaties, bilateral or
multilateral in character, can establish customary international law, binding on all nations.
See INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 149, at 69-74 and the essays collected therein. In the
strictest formulation of the doctrine, a principle cannot become a customary rule of interna-
tional law unless there is widespread state practice with regard to the principle, accompa-
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when states choose to recognize the juridical capacity of foreign
corporations, their courts are free, as American courts are, to
pierce the veils of subsidiary corporations doing business within
their territories. 79 A large number of bilateral or multilateral trea-
ties on the subject could relieve the current instability in the
law.1 80 The reciprocity rule might be of assistance in this endeavor.
Finally, as a fourth alternative, it is possible to go to the oppo-
site extreme of the unlimited liability rule and adopt an irrebut-
table presumption whereby a court will always respect the inde-
pendent legal status of a government corporation. Under this rule,
not even the equitable considerations that the Court in Banco
Para El Comercio espoused could rebut this presumption. Like the
unlimited liability rule, the irrebuttable presumption of indepen-
dence serves the values of uniformity, predictability, and neutral-
ity. It also precludes the occurrence of untimely disputes that may
arise between the United States and foreign nations under contin-
ued application of the principles announced in Banco Para El Co-
mercio. The courts would not inquire into the juridical divisions
that a state established beyond the initial inquiry made to deter-
mine that the entity was made juridically separate from the gov-
ernment. If the President so determined, any vindication of Ameri-
can policies against expropriations in violation of international law
would take place on a political, rather than judicial, level. The
freezing of foreign assets in the United States followed by a negoti-
ated lump-sum settlement from those assets and ratable distribu-
tion to expropriation victims might be one solution."' Note, how-
ever, the inherent doctrinal contradiction presented by creating an
nied by a belief by the states that they are acting under a legal obligation. North Sea Conti-
nental Shelf Cases (Fed. Rep. Ger. v. Den.) (Fed. Rep. Ger. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 4, 43-44.
The belief that a state is acting under a legal obligation is known as "opinio juris." Id. at 44.
Disagreement about the need for opinio juris in addition to state practice gives rise to the
debate about treaties' acting as a source of customary international law. See INTERNATIONAL
LAW, supra note 149, at 69-74. If one adopts the strict formulation of the doctrine, numer-
ous treaties that deal with matters within the discretion of states would never, by them-
selves, lead to a rule of customary international law concerning those matters, because they
would lack the necessary opinio juris. Id. at 73-74. Arguably, this would be the result in the
case of treaties wherein states agree to recognize the juridical capacity of foreign corpora-
tions. See Drucker, supra note 178, at 42.
179. See Griffin, The Power of Host Countries Over the Multinational: Lifting the Veil
in the European Economic Community and the United States, 6 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus.
375, 387-435 (1974). A foreign court may also pierce the veil of the parent corporation to
obtain jurisdiction of a subsidiary that does not do business in its territory. Id.
180. Id. at 434-35.
181. See I F.V. GARCIA-AMADOR, THE CHANGING LAW OF INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS 312
(1984).
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irrebuttable presumption of a government corporation's separate
legal status and then blocking the corporation's own assets to-
gether with those assets indisputably belonging to the government.
This contradiction may be resolved on a policy level by pointing
out that the reason for. the irrebuttable presumption is to place the
question of disregarding a foreign government corporation's sepa-
rateness in the hands of the President for foreign policy purposes.
In view of the assaults on the act of state doctrine,182 a doc-
trine that appears to vindicate the policies outlined above, it is un-
likely that Congress would adopt the irrebuttable presumption in
favor of separateness without carving a few exceptions into it.I 83
The Supreme Court almost certainly would not do so.
18 4
VIII. THE RULE OF LAW: A CHOICE AMONG COMPETING POLICIES
The law cannot remain where Banco Para El Comercio has
left it. 88 Its holding is too narrow;186 its rule is undefined. 87 The
Supreme Court, however, is not totally to blame. The question
before it, although legal in nature, had important policy underpin-
nings the careless resolution of which could have had negative ef-
fects on American interests abroad. 88 This dilemma led the Court
to compromise.' a9
The Court's failure to articulate a satisfactory rule of law un-
derscores the need for executive and legislative action in this area.
Four alternatives are set forth above-there may be others. It is
important that the rule that the United States government ulti-
mately chooses reflect American interests and, if possible, afford
182. See supra note 171.
183. Of course, the presumption would no longer be considered irrebuttable.
184. The Court has riddled the act of state doctrine with exceptions. See, e.g., Alfred
Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976) (distinguishes commercial
act from act of state); First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972)
(Justice Douglas's concurring opinion may have created a counterclaim exception to the act
of state doctrine); see INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 149, at 132-35; Swan, Act of State at
Bay: A Plea on Behalf of the Elusive Doctrine, 1976 DuKE L.J. 807; Comment, Rational-
izing the Federal Act of State Doctrine and Evolving Judicial Exceptions, 46 FORDHAM L.
REV. 295 (1977). In Banco Para El Comercio, the Court, in a footnote, disposed of any sug-
gestion that the act of state doctrine precluded it from determining the setoff issue. 103 S.
Ct. at 2604 n.28.
185. Becker, supra note 11, at 460 (saying the same about C. Czarnikow Ltd. v. Cen-
trala Handlo Zagranicznego "Rolimpex," [1977] A.C. 351).
186. See supra text accompanying notes 127-32 and paragraph in text following note
166.
187. See supra paragraph in text following note 166.
188. See supra notes 176-80 and accompanying text.
189. See supra text accompanying notes 111-34.
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predictability and uniformity of result.
From the standpoint of these values, the unlimited liability
rule is the best alternative. Not only does it have a sound doctrinal
foundation, but its even-handed application, without regard to mo-
mentary political considerations, serves American interests as well.
Because a blanket rule of unlimited liability does not distinguish
among countries that litigate in the United. States, a state finding
the veil of its government corporations pierced could hardly com-
plain of prejudice against it. At the same time, some Americans
whose foreign assets have been expropriated could obtain some
measure of relief that did not depend on the vagaries of interna-
tional politics.190
RAQUEL A. RODRIGUEZ
190. Even if the United States froze the offending state's assets, claimants could not be
sure of when they would see some compensation, if ever. Cf. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453
U.S. 654 (1981) (upholding presidential power to suspend American claims against Iran and
transfer $2.2 billion in frozen Iranian assets from United States banks to the Bank of Eng-
land and the Federal Reserve Bank pending resolution of the claims by the Iran-United
States Claim Tribunal).
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